

MithyAtva of MithyAtva

When it is said in VedAnta that Brahman is sat or satya and world is mithyA, then the natural corollary is that Brahman has satyatva and world has mithyAtva.

Definition of satyatva and mithyAtva

What exactly is this satyatva and mithyAtva?

Satyatva refers to sattva which means त्रैकालिक-अबाध्यत्व traikAlika-abAdhyatva. i.e. the absence of sublatability in all three periods of time. TraikAlika-nishedha refers to atyanta-abhAva. Thus, satyatva means atyanta-abhAva of sublatability.

MithyAtva, on the other hand, means प्रतिपन्न-उपाधौ त्रैकालिक-निषेध-प्रतियोगित्वम् i.e. स्व-प्रकारक-धी-विशेष्य-अभिन्न-अधिकरण-वृत्ति-अत्यंत-अभाव-प्रतियोगित्वम्. This basically defines mithyAtva as the counter-positive-ness of the traikAlika-negation (atyanta-abhAva) in the locus which is the noun and has the impugned object (mithyA pratiyogI) as the adjective in the knowledge. Thus, 'this is silver' is the knowledge which has shukti-which-is-non-different-from-this as the noun and silver as the adjective. Now, silver is the pratiyogI of atyanta-abhAva in shukti-which-is-non-different-from-this. Because despite being seen in shukti, silver is never present there. Not even prAtibhAsik silver is ever present there. Hence, silver is pratiyogI of atyanta-abhAva and the anuyogI is shukti. The pratoyogitA i.e. counter-positive-ness is called mithyAtva.

Is mithyAtva satya or mithyA?

Now the question arises as to whether mithyAtva is satya or mithyA. We have held that the world is mithyA. Therefore, the world has mithyAtva. Now, if the mithyAtva were to be satya, then there will be another satya in addition to Brahman and advaita is compromised. Also, the world possessing satya mithyAtva will turn into satya itself and thereby contradicting its mithyAtva,

On the other hand, if mithyAtva were to be mithyA, then it implies that there is atyanta-abhAva of mithyAtva in the world (प्रतिपन्न-उपाधि). So, the mithyAtva of mithyAtva would imply that there is an atyanta-abhAva which has the world as the anuyogI and mithyAtva as the pratiyogI. This basically would imply that there is no mithyAtva in the world.

Which then may imply the conclusion that the world has satyatva since it does not have mithyAtva.

Do satyatva and mithyAtva co-exist in the world

Now, here comes the problem. There is a prima facie acceptance of satyatva in the world. And the mithyAtva of the world is proved by anumAna. Both satyatva and mithyAtva appear to be present in the world and both are contradictory dharmAs.

Now two dharmAs can be either paraspara-viraha-rUpa, paraspara-viraha-vyApaka-rupa or paraspara-viraha-vyApya-rUpa. The same are clarified as under:

Let there be two dharmAs A and B. Three situations may arise which are delineated as under:-

- A is B-abhAva and B is A-abhAva. Here, A and B are called paraspara-viraha-rUpa. For example, rajatatva and rajatatva-abhAva are paraspara-viraha-rUpa-dharma.
- Wherever there is A-abhAva, there is B AND wherever there is B-abhAva, there is A. Here, A and B are called paraspara-viraha-vyApaka-rUpa. For example, rajata-tva and rajata-bhinna-tva.
- Wherever there is A, there is B-abhAva AND wherever there is B, there is A-abhAva. Here, A and B are called paraspara-viraha-vyApya-rUpa. For example, cow-hood and horse-hood.

To understand the usage of the word vyApya, we should remember vahni-vyApyo-dhUmah. Hetu, sAdhana and vyApya are synonyms. So, fire is vyApaka and smoke is vyApya.


Now, as a matter of rule, it is only in the cases of paraspara-viraha-rUpa-dharma and paraspara-viraha-vyApaka-rupa-dharma that abhAva of A shall result in presence of B and vice versa. In case of paraspara-viraha-vyApya-rUpa-dharma, there is no such rule.

For example, wherever there is cow-ness, there is horse-ness-abhAva and wherever there is horse-ness, there is cowness-abhAva. Yet, one cannot say that wherever there is cow-ness-abhAva, there will be horse-ness. For example, an elephant has both cow-ness-abhAva and horse-ness-abhAva.


Reason for co-existence of contradictory dharmAs

Now, why exactly is it so? Why is it that only in cases of paraspara-viraha-rUpa-dharma and paraspara-viraha-vyApaka-rupa-dharma, the abhAva of A results into presence of B and not in cases of paraspara-viraha-vyApya-dharma? This is because, the nishedhyatA-avachchedaka of A and B are different in paraspara-viraha-rUpa-dharma and paraspara-viraha-vyApaka-rupa-dharma, while the nishedhyatA-avachchedaka-dharma are same in case of paraspara-viraha-vyApya-rUpa-dharma.


For example, in the case of paraspara-viraha-rUpa-dharma, the nishedhyatA-avachchedaka-dharma shall be rajatatva-tva and rajatatva-abhAva-tva. The pictorial representation is as under: -



In case of paraspara-viraha-vyApaka-rUpa-dharma, the nishedhyatA-avachchedaka-dharma shall be rajatatva-tva and rajata-bhinnatva-tva. The pictorial representation is as under: -




In case of paraspara-viraha-vyApya-rUpa-dharma, the nishedhyatA-avachchedaka-dharma are not necessarily different. And hence, no rule can be made that abhAva of A shall result in presence of B. Here, the nishedhyatA-avachchedaka-dharma is the same, namely gajatva-atyanta-abhAva-tva. The pictorial representation is as under: -



Now, in case of the dharmAs namely mithyAtva and satyatva, let us examine which category do they fall under. MithyAtva and satyatva have already been defined. Here, the satyatva is defined for Brahman. However, we assign that satyatva to the world due to ignorance and think that world is satya. The satyatva which is seen to belong to the world is therefore mithyA. That is because the satyatva of world has drishyatva. And drishyatva implies mithyAtva.

Now, we see both mithyAtva and satyatva to belong to the world and see both of these to have drishyatva. And hence both of them are mithyA. Thus, mithyAtva-abhAva and satyatva-abhAva can coexist because their nishedhyatA-avachchedaka is the same, namely drishyatva. The pictorial representation is as under: -



Thus, the satyatva-seen-in-the-world and mithyAtva are merely contradictory dharmAs which are paraspara-viraha-vyApya-rUpa like cow-ness and horse-ness and the abhAva of either does not imply the presence of the other and hence the abhAva of both mithyAtva and satyatva-seen-in-the-world coexist in the world.

Thus, the world is **prima facie** seen to possess mithyAtva and satyatva, which is indicated by dotted lines. Both of these are mithyA on account of being drishya.

The mithyAtva of mithyAtva does not prove satyatva of world and the mithyAtva of satyatva does not prove mithyAtva of the world because the nishedhyatA-avachchedaka-dharma is same namely drishyatva. Both of these are thus having atyanta-abhAva in their locus i.e. the world.

When we say that there is abhAva of A, then we are negating A. Thus, A has nishedhyatA which is the same as pratiyogitA.

This satyatva-seen-in-the-world and the satyatva, as defined earlier as त्रैकालिक-अबाध्यत्व, are not the same. Because satyatva per se does not have drishyatva.

MithyAtva vis-a-vis kAlpanika satyatva

What exactly would be the relation between mithyAtva and satyatva? Can the negation of mithyAtva imply satyatva if they are paraspara-viraha-rUpa? It should, provided mithyAtva and satyatva are of the same order. Thus, presence of vyAvahArika-mithyAtva would imply absence of vyAvahArika-satyatva. However, it would not imply abhAva of prAtibhAsika-satyatva.

Sublation of both world and its mithyAtva through singular Brahma-jnAna

What exactly is the condition which is the deciding factor in two dharmAs being of same order or of different order?

If by the knowledge of one dharma, the other dharma is sublated, then the two dharmAs are of different order. For example, rajata-abhAva and shukti-rUpya. Here, by the knowledge of rajata-abhAva, the shukti-rUpya is negated. Hence, shukti-rUpya and rajata-abhAva are considered to be of different orders.

On the other hand, if by the knowledge of one dharma, both dharmAs are negated, then they are considered to be of the same order. For example, by the knowledge, 'this is shell', both shukti-rUpya and shukti-bhinnatva (the difference of shukti-rUpya from shukti) are sublated. There can be no shukti-bheda in the absence of shukti-rUpya. Thus, by one knowledge, both dharma are sublated and hence they are of the same order, in this case prAtibhAsika.

In the present context, both world and mithyAtva are sublated by one Brahma-jnAna. Hence, they are of the same order.

Thus, the original question that the mithyAtva of mithyAtva implies satyatva of the world is a non-starter. How? Because, the mithyAtva of mithyAtva implies, there is atyanta-abhAva of mithyAtva in the world (the locus of mithyAtva). Thus, the knowledge of atyanta-abhAva of the mithyAtva would imply the sublation of both dharma of equal order namely mithyAtva as well as the world. Now, once the world itself is sublated, there is no occasion for satyatva to belong to it.

Revision:

- MithyAtva and satyatva-seen-in-the-world are paraspara-viraha-vyApya-dharma. Hence, abhAva of one does not imply presence of the other.
- MithyAtva and satyatva-seen-in-the-world are neither paraspara-viraha-rUpa-dharma nor paraspara-viraha-vyApaka-dharma.
- If mithyAtva and satyatva are taken to be paraspara-viraha-rUpa-dharma, even then there would arise no contradiction if satyatva is taken to mean kAlpanika-satyatva.
- Both mithyAtva and the world are of the same order of existence as they are sublated by one Brahma-jnAna. Hence, by the knowledge of abhAva of mithyAtva in the world, being of the same order, the world also gets sublated and hence satyatva has no locus to reside.